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| Overall Assessment |
Comment |
Score |
| Strong |
Hyosung Chemical discloses a substantial amount of detail about its climate-policy lobbying. It names the precise measures it engages on, including the Korean Emissions Trading Scheme and its upcoming “Benchmark (BM) allocation targets for the 4th planning period,” as well as the “Act on Carbon Neutrality and Green Growth to Respond to the Climate Crisis” and the “Act on the Allocation and Trading of Greenhouse Gas Emission Permits.” The company also sets out how it lobbies, citing “activities such as data surveys and public hearings,” participation in “public forums, working groups, and consultations,” and its listing on the government’s “List of companies subject to allocation of emission trading system NGMS,” all of which involve direct interaction with the Government of the Republic of Korea. Finally, it is clear about what it wants to achieve, stating that it seeks to “contribute to the determination of BM allocation coefficients,” that it “supports national greenhouse gas reduction plans and the greenhouse gas reduction policy through emissions trading,” and linking this to its own 2030 emissions-reduction goal. These disclosures together demonstrate a strong degree of transparency across the policies addressed, the mechanisms employed, and the outcomes sought in its climate-related lobbying.
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3
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| Overall Assessment |
Comment |
Score |
| Moderate |
Hyosung Chemical discloses some mechanisms that connect its climate-related engagement with internal governance structures, indicating a moderate level of lobbying oversight. The company states that it has “a public commitment or position statement to conduct your engagement activities in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement” and describes that it “suggests its opinion … through the Korea Petrochemical Industry Association (KPIA)” while also “strengthen[ing] the cooperation with the government and supply networks” to influence Korea’s emissions-trading system, showing that both direct and trade-association channels are considered. Oversight of these activities is assigned to a formal body: the “ESG Management Promotion Committee operates a regular meeting once a quarter under the supervision of the CEO … [and] ultimately approves activities related to climate change issues … and oversight and guidance on value chain engagement,” and the CEO “also serves as the chair of the board of directors.” However, the disclosure does not spell out a systematic process for reviewing or auditing whether the positions taken by the company or by KPIA are aligned with its climate strategy; there is no mention of criteria for assessing trade-association policies, no examples of engaging, correcting, or exiting misaligned bodies, and no dedicated report on lobbying alignment. The references to monitoring “K-ETS trends” and reflecting engagement outcomes in “Green Management Vision 2030” show integration with climate strategy, but the company does not disclose how it tracks, evaluates, or publicly reports on the consistency of its lobbying with the Paris goals. Overall, the evidence indicates some governance and high-level oversight but limited transparency and detail on monitoring and alignment mechanisms for climate lobbying.
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2
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