Arcelik AS – Lobbying Governance & Transparency

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Lobbying Governance

Overall Assessment	Analysis	Score
Strong	Arçelik discloses a structured process that integrates climate-related lobbying oversight into its wider sustainability governance. The company states that its “sector related engagements and representations in the leading and major trade/industry associations are monthly reported to the top management,” and commits that “in case such contradicting opinions arise, Arçelik commits to not be part of any organization or cooperation that would divert its mission away from transition to a low carbon economy.” Oversight is clearly assigned: “The Chief Sustainability, Quality & Customer Care Officer is responsible for reviewing and monitoring the alignment of the policies of the NGOs, trade associations and other related organizations or institutions with Arçelik’s decarbonization strategy and the requirements of the Paris Agreement,” while the “Quality, Sustainability and Corporate Affairs (QSCA) Executive Director is responsible for the oversight of all communications with related institutions in line with Arçelik’s Climate Change Strategy.” A dedicated Global Sectoral Relations Management department “coordinates relations with Trade and Industry Associations, operational NGOs and civil society organizations in all jurisdictions in which Arçelik operates,” indicating that both direct engagement with public bodies and indirect lobbying via associations fall under the same control system. The company also pledges to “publicly communicate the position of the trade associations and other related organizations in which Arçelik is a member, including reporting on any misalignment,” and links executive incentives to this framework by noting that “sustainability-related KPIs are included in the related employees’, including C and D-level executives’ annual performance evaluation score cards.” These disclosures demonstrate a defined policy, explicit monitoring procedures and named senior oversight covering both direct and indirect lobbying, which signals strong governance; however, the evidence does not refer to a publicly available, detailed lobbying-alignment report or an example of a corrective action taken with a misaligned association, so the transparency of outcomes remains limited. View Sources	B

Overall Assessment

Analysis

Score

Strong

Arçelik discloses a structured process that integrates climate-related lobbying oversight into its wider sustainability governance. The company states that its “sector related engagements and representations in the leading and major trade/industry associations are monthly reported to the top management,” and commits that “in case such contradicting opinions arise, Arçelik commits to not be part of any organization or cooperation that would divert its mission away from transition to a low carbon economy.” Oversight is clearly assigned: “The Chief Sustainability, Quality & Customer Care Officer is responsible for reviewing and monitoring the alignment of the policies of the NGOs, trade associations and other related organizations or institutions with Arçelik’s decarbonization strategy and the requirements of the Paris Agreement,” while the “Quality, Sustainability and Corporate Affairs (QSCA) Executive Director is responsible for the oversight of all communications with related institutions in line with Arçelik’s Climate Change Strategy.” A dedicated Global Sectoral Relations Management department “coordinates relations with Trade and Industry Associations, operational NGOs and civil society organizations in all jurisdictions in which Arçelik operates,” indicating that both direct engagement with public bodies and indirect lobbying via associations fall under the same control system. The company also pledges to “publicly communicate the position of the trade associations and other related organizations in which Arçelik is a member, including reporting on any misalignment,” and links executive incentives to this framework by noting that “sustainability-related KPIs are included in the related employees’, including C and D-level executives’ annual performance evaluation score cards.” These disclosures demonstrate a defined policy, explicit monitoring procedures and named senior oversight covering both direct and indirect lobbying, which signals strong governance; however, the evidence does not refer to a publicly available, detailed lobbying-alignment report or an example of a corrective action taken with a misaligned association, so the transparency of outcomes remains limited.

View Sources

Lobbying Transparency

Overall Assessment	Analysis	Score
Comprehensive	Arçelik provides an unusually rich picture of its climate-policy lobbying. It names a wide range of concrete measures it has engaged on, including Turkey’s “Partnership for Market Readiness (PMR) Project” and the related “Climate Change Law and ETS regulations,” the Turkish “Regulation on Monitoring, Reporting, Verification (MRV) of GHG Emissions,” the EU Emissions Trading System, the “Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism,” the EU Green Deal and the “Regulation on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE),” giving enough detail to identify each policy and its jurisdiction. The company also explains how it tries to influence those measures. It describes submitting written comments to the Turkish Ministry of Environment, Urban Planning and Climate Change, collaborating with the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources on emission-factor calculations, taking part in “several stakeholder meetings and feedback rounds” under the PMR Turkey Project, carrying out “analytical studies” and building “a registry software program for ETS,” and channeling its views through trade bodies such as APPLiA, DigitalEurope, TÜSİAD and the World Bank’s Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition, thereby clearly indicating both its direct and indirect mechanisms and the specific government or multilateral targets. Finally, Arçelik spells out the results it seeks: it supports establishing “the legal and institutional infrastructure on the Climate Change Law and ETS regulations,” setting “an upper limit for the emissions and forming allocation plans for Pilot ETS,” aligning carbon-pricing systems to “reach global climate targets,” using ETS revenues to “transform industry and eliminate any possible social effects of climate change,” backing the EU Green Deal’s objective of a 55 % emissions cut by 2030, and promoting a robust WEEE system without exemptions. This level of disclosure across policies, mechanisms and desired outcomes demonstrates comprehensive transparency in the company’s climate-related lobbying activities.	A