Direct Lobbying Transparency
Overall Assessment | Comment | Score |
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Comprehensive | Ferrari provides an unusually thorough picture of its climate-policy lobbying. It names multiple identifiable regulations it has sought to influence, including Regulation (EU) 2019/631 on CO₂ performance standards and its amendment Regulation (EU) 2023/851, as well as petitions to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for “alternative standards for the model years 2017-2021 and 2022-2025” and to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) for “alternative CAFE standards” and an exemption for model year 2020; it also discloses an application for derogation under the same EU regulation to the UK Department for Transport and the Vehicle Certification Agency. The company is explicit about how it lobbies: it is registered on the European Transparency Register and has “directly engaged with a series of public institutions (e.g. the EU Commission in the European Union, and the EPA and the NHTSA in the United States),” using formal mechanisms such as petitions and derogation applications addressed to those specific regulators. Ferrari is equally clear about what it wants to achieve, seeking “alternative CO₂ specific emissions targets for the period 2022-2026 in the EU,” adjusted standards from the EPA, and “alternative CAFE standards” or exemptions from NHTSA so that requirements “align with the company’s technical and economic capabilities.” By detailing the concrete policies, the exact governmental targets, the lobbying tools employed, and the precise regulatory outcomes it pursues, Ferrari demonstrates a high level of transparency over its climate-related lobbying activities. | 4 |