Lobbying Governance
| Overall Assessment | Analysis | Score |
|---|---|---|
| None |
No evidence found
View Sources
|
E |
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Sign Up| Overall Assessment | Analysis | Score |
|---|---|---|
| None |
No evidence found
View Sources
|
E |
| Overall Assessment | Analysis | Score |
|---|---|---|
| Limited |
Tokuyama provides only limited transparency on its climate-policy lobbying. It does refer to two identifiable Japanese policy measures – the government’s “growth-oriented” carbon-pricing plan that will introduce emissions trading from FY2023 and a carbon levy by FY2028, and the April 2023 Revised Act on Rationalizing Energy Use that sets non-fossil-energy conversion requirements – indicating that these are areas in which the company is engaged. Beyond noting that it participates in collective initiatives such as the GX League and the Shunan Industrial Complex Decarbonization Promotion Council, however, the company does not describe what specific mechanisms it uses to influence policymakers or name any concrete governmental targets of that engagement. Likewise, it sets out only broad corporate objectives, such as achieving carbon neutrality by FY2050 and a 30 % emissions cut by FY2030, without clarifying what changes in public policy it is advocating to accomplish those goals. As a result, while a reader can discern the policy arenas the company is monitoring or aligning with, the disclosures leave most of the actual lobbying activity, methods and desired legislative outcomes unspecified.
|
D |