Sumitomo Corp

Lobbying Transparency and Governance

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Direct Lobbying Transparency
Overall Assessment Comment Score
Limited Sumitomo Corporation offers only limited transparency about its climate-policy lobbying. It refers to participating in policy forums – for example, it says it has joined “working groups under the GX League” led by Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and that it leads a hydrogen-supply “Special Interest Group” convened by the UK’s North Sea Transition Authority – but it does not explain in any detail how it engages decision-makers, such as whether it sends letters, holds meetings, or submits consultation responses. Likewise, the company mentions broad policy arenas such as Japan’s “Basic Policy for the Realization of GX,” the UK Government’s hydrogen-economy proposals and the Net Zero Hydrogen Fund, yet it does not clearly identify any specific statute, regulation or bill it has tried to influence. Finally, its stated objectives remain high-level aspirations—supporting national decarbonisation goals, expanding hydrogen and CCS value chains and “contributing to rule-making for carbon-credit markets”—without describing the concrete legislative or regulatory changes it seeks. Because the disclosures stop short of naming distinct policies, detailing engagement methods, or spelling out the outcomes it is pursuing, the company provides only a minimal picture of its climate lobbying activities. 1
Lobbying Governance
Overall Assessment Comment Score
Moderate Sumitomo Corp discloses several mechanisms that indicate an emerging governance framework for climate-related lobbying. The company states that "when assessing whether to join membership with an industry group, we confirm whether the group's climate change initiatives are consistent with our policy on climate change," showing a defined screening process to align indirect lobbying through trade associations with its own climate policy. Oversight of these activities is embedded in its sustainability governance: the "Corporate Sustainability Committee operates as an advisory body to the Management Council, reporting and referring important sustainability-related initiatives to the Management Council and the Board of Directors," and "the progress of JETRO activities is reported to the Corporate Sustainability Committee and the Board of Directors as necessary," which identifies clear escalation to senior governance bodies. The company also has a public commitment "to conduct your engagement activities in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement," further signalling an intention to keep lobbying aligned with its climate strategy. However, the disclosure does not describe a systematic, recurring review or audit of either direct lobbying activities or trade-association positions. It has disclosed to CDP about its lobbying alignment with Japan Foreign Trade Council, Inc., where it engaged the trade association, and "they have changed their position." However this one example does not demonstrate a full governance process to engage, correct, or exiting groups whose stances conflict with its climate goals. The process for monitoring the companys own direct advocacy is not explained, indicating moderate governance strength, but leaves gaps in comprehensive monitoring, direct lobbying alignment, and transparency on outcomes. 2