Doosan Enerbility Co Ltd

Lobbying Governance & Transparency

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Lobbying Governance
Overall Assessment Analysis Score
None Doosan Enerbility’s disclosures focus on its ESG Committee and a Green Financing Working Group (GFWG), noting that “the new ESG Committee is chaired by the COO, with the heads of the business divisions overseeing the Environmental, Social and Governance pillars” and that Doosan has “established a dedicated Green Financing Working Group (‘GFWG’) to oversee the selection of Eligible Green Project and their compliance with the eligibility criteria described in the Framework.” However, the company does not disclose any internal mechanisms, oversight bodies, named individuals, or specific processes for governing its direct or indirect lobbying activities or for aligning policy engagement with its climate objectives, and there is no mention of any lobbying audits, reviews, or engagement with trade associations on climate policy.

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E
Lobbying Transparency
Overall Assessment Analysis Score
Limited Doosan Enerbility offers only limited detail on its climate-related lobbying. It indicates that “Team Korea focuses on Nuclear Projects in Czech Republic and Poland” and that it has engaged the “UK Gov’t and Parliament” on nuclear exports, signalling some involvement in nuclear energy policy discussions, but it stops short of naming any specific bills, regulations or formal consultations. The company does identify a couple of channels it uses—participation in the Team Korea consortium aimed at influencing U.K. decision-makers and the signing of a memorandum of understanding with a Polish state-owned power company and a private contractor—providing two concrete examples of indirect lobbying along with the corresponding targets. However, it does not explain whether it also writes letters, meets officials, submits evidence, or uses other mechanisms, leaving most methods undisclosed. On intended outcomes, the disclosure is aspirational rather than precise; references to completing a “world first 400 MW hydrogen gas turbine by 2027” and hoping for “more Carbon Free Nuclear Power” describe business goals and broad sectoral trends rather than stating the legislative or regulatory changes the company is advocating. Overall, the information supplied gives a partial view of Doosan Enerbility’s lobbying activities but lacks the specificity and completeness that would demonstrate full transparency.

D